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  1 
ROLLOVER RISK: IDEATING A U.S. DEBT 
DEFAULT 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ* 
Abstract: This Article examines how a U.S. debt default might occur, how it 
could be avoided, its potential consequences if not avoided, and how those con-
sequences could be mitigated. The most realistic default would result from roll-
over risk: the risk that the government will be temporarily unable to borrow suf-
ficient funds to repay its maturing debt. The United States, like most govern-
ments, routinely finances itself through short-term debt, which is less expensive 
than long-term debt. But this cost-saving does not come free of charge: it in-
creases the threat of default. A U.S. debt default—even a mere “technical” de-
fault such as temporarily missing an interest or principal payment—would have 
severe economic and systemic consequences both domestically and worldwide. 
Such a default would also raise a host of legal issues, including questions of first 
impression under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although many would agree that “an eventual default [by the United 
States government] on [its] Treasury debt [is] a conceivable, although unlikely, 
outcome,” concern is growing.1 When the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury met 
recently with a group of Chinese students, they laughed contemptuously at the 
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 1 Deborah Lucas, The Federal Debt: Assessing the Capacity to Pay, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT 
DEBT DIFFERENT? 101, 101 (Franklin Allen et al. eds., 2012) (arguing “that current fiscal policy is 
on an unsustainable trajectory”); see Satyajit Das, The Main Event—The U.S. Debt Crisis, ECONO-
MONITOR (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2011/11/the-main-event-the-u-s-
debt-crisis/, archived at http://perma.cc/0Zd5nPT3GwZ (noting that “[n]on-American observers 
view the debt ceiling debate with morbid fascination and increasing concern”). 
2 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1 
assertion that U.S. government bonds are “safe” investments.2 The expanding 
international market in credit-default swaps on U.S. debt echoes this concern.3 
Whatever might be the likelihood of a U.S. debt default, its harm could 
be devastating.4 Furthermore, as this Article explains, certain types of U.S. 
debt defaults are actually quite realistic.5 It is therefore important to think 
through how a U.S. debt default might occur, how it could be avoided, its 
potential consequences if it is not avoided, and how those consequences 
could be mitigated. 
Part I of this Article examines how the United States might default on its 
debt, differentiating defaults caused by insolvency from temporary defaults 
caused by illiquidity.6 The latter, which are potentiated by rollover risk,7 are 
not only plausible but have occurred in the past.8 Moreover, the ongoing con-
troversy over the federal debt ceiling and the rise of the shadow-banking sys-
tem make these types of defaults even more likely today.9 
Part II examines how a U.S. debt default could be avoided, discussing 
steps—such as monetizing its debt and printing money to pay maturing 
debt—that the government can take to facilitate debt repayment.10 Part II also 
examines the limits on the government’s ability to avoid defaulting.11 
Part III of this Article analyzes the consequences of a U.S. debt de-
fault.12 Any such default, even one that is temporary, would have severe eco-
nomic and systemic consequences, significantly raising the cost of borrowing 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Das, supra note 1. 
 3 See Richard Squire, A Market for End-of-the-World Insurance? Credit Default Swaps on US 
Government Debt, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 69, 71 (explaining 
that sovereign borrowers represent a large portion of reference entities in the credit-default swaps 
market). Credit-default swaps (“CDS”) are bets on the likelihood that a reference entity—in this 
case the U.S. government—will default on its debt. Id. at 72–73. 
 4 See infra notes 111–194 and accompanying text (discussing the potential legal and econom-
ic consequences of a U.S. debt default). 
 5 See infra notes 16–59 and accompanying text (explaining how rollover risk increases the 
risk of U.S. default on its sovereign debt). 
 6 See infra notes 16–59 and accompanying text. 
 7 Rollover risk is the risk that the government will be temporarily unable to borrow sufficient 
funds to repay its maturing debt. See infra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining rollover 
risk). 
 8 See infra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that in 1979 the federal debt ceiling 
prevented the U.S. government from borrowing sufficient funds to repay maturing debt, which 
resulted in a default). 
 9 See infra notes 33–59 and accompanying text (explaining how rollover risk applies specifi-
cally to U.S. sovereign debt). 
 10 See infra notes 60–110 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 91–110 and accompanying text (explaining how the magnitude of the prob-
lem could make it difficult to avoid a U.S. debt default). 
 12 See infra notes 111–194 and accompanying text. 
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and causing securities markets to plummet.13 A U.S. debt default also would 
raise a host of legal issues, including questions of first impression under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.14 
Finally, Part IV explores how the negative consequences of a default 
might be mitigated, potentially through bilateral or unilateral debt restructur-
ing or even through a possible International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout.15 
The Article concludes, however, that neither a debt restructuring nor an IMF 
bailout would likely be successful in effectively mitigating those consequences. 
It therefore may be more prudent to try to minimize rollover risk ab initio, 
such as by better managing the issuance of short-term government debt and 
considering austerity measures that would reasonably limit the government’s 
need to borrow. 
I. HOW MIGHT THE UNITED STATES DEFAULT ON ITS NATIONAL DEBT? 
The classic view is that a national debt default, meaning a “hard default” 
on the debt, which includes non-payment of debt when due, ultimately de-
pends on the country’s expenditures exceeding taxes and new borrowings.16 
That view, however, does not adequately differentiate between insolvency 
and illiquidity. Insolvency occurs when total liabilities exceed the value of 
total assets, whereas illiquidity occurs when liquid assets—for example, cash, 
short-term securities, and other assets readily convertible to cash—are insuf-
ficient to pay current liabilities as they become due.17 It is possible for a na-
tion to be solvent but illiquid, causing the nation to default on its debt.18 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See infra notes 175–194 and accompanying text (discussing the economic consequences of 
a default). 
 14 See infra notes 114–174 and accompanying text (discussing possible legal consequences of 
a U.S. default). 
 15 See infra notes 195–232 and accompanying text. 
 16 See Richard H. Herring, Default and the International Role of the Dollar, in IS U.S. GOV-
ERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 21, 21 (also using the term “hard default” to de-
scribe a distressed exchange offer); Howell E. Jackson, The 2011 Debt Ceiling Impasse Revisited, 
in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 55, 58–59. 
 17 SERGEI A. DAVYDENKO, INSOLVENCY, ILLIQUIDITY, AND THE RISK OF DEFAULT 1 (2012). 
Illiquidity might reduce solvency by forcing a debtor to sell valuable assets at a loss in order to pay 
current liabilities. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Shortages and Banking 
Crises 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8937, 2002), available at http://www.
nber.org/papers/w8937.pdf?new_window=1, archived at http://perma.cc/0BSqtPQAWJ9. 
 18 See Terry Belton et al., The Domino Effect of a US Treasury Technical Default, J.P. MOR-
GAN 1–2 (Apr. 19, 2011), http://valkayec.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/morgan.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/0ZNnoaut2AB (explaining the possible effects of a technical default on U.S. debt 
caused by the failure to raise the debt ceiling). 
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This Article assumes that the United States is unlikely to become insol-
vent soon.19 Nonetheless, there is a real risk that the United States could be-
come illiquid.20 The most likely cause of illiquidity is rollover risk: the gov-
ernment’s temporary inability to borrow sufficient funds to repay or refinance 
its maturing debt.21 
A. Rollover Risk and Illiquidity 
Rollover risk is not merely theoretical. A former Under Secretary of the 
Treasury for Domestic Finance recently observed that “[i]f you ask [U.S.] 
Treasury . . . officials responsible for debt management ‘What keeps you up 
at night?’ the only candid reply will be: the risk of not being able to roll[]over 
their debt at the next auction. In practice, debt sustainability is about rollover 
risk . . . .”22 
This mirrors one of the author’s earliest experiences practicing law. New 
York’s Monroe County had short-term revenue-anticipation notes coming 
due. As it had done many times in the past, the county—which was financial-
ly solvent—offered new notes for sale at public auction, intending to use the 
proceeds to repay the maturing notes. Unfortunately, because of feared conta-
gion from what was then New York City’s financial crisis,23 nobody showed 
up to buy the new notes. 
Though seemingly less dramatic than insolvency, a U.S. debt default 
caused by rollover risk could seriously undermine the perception of U.S. gov-
                                                                                                                           
 19 But see Satyajit Das, “We Interrupt Regular Programming to Announce That the United 
States of America Has Defaulted,” ECONOMONITOR (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.economonitor.
com/blog/2008/11/we-interrupt-regular-programming-to-announce-that-the-united-states-of-america-
has-defaulted/, archived at http://perma.cc/0u2L9S4KWnN (quoting the head of global investment 
for South Korea’s National Pension Fund, Kwag Dae Hwan, as stating that “[a] big question mark 
hangs over whether the US can deal with an unprecedented amount of debt. That is unnerving all the 
investors, including me.”). 
 20 See Nouriel Roubini, Liquidity/Rollover Risk on US Assets? A Nightmare Hard Landing Scenar-
io for the US $ and US Bond Market, ECONOMONITOR (Dec. 21, 2004), http://www.economonitor.com/ 
nouriel/2004/12/21/liquidityrollover-risk-on-us-assets-a-nightmare-hard-landing-scenario-for-the-us- 
and-the-us-bond-market/, archived at http://perma.cc/0pzwZqEYeHE (explaining that there is a real 
risk of a liquidity crisis in the United States). 
 21 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, J. 
ECON. PERSPS., Winter 2009, at 77, 91–92 (discussing rollover risk in the context of the private 
market). Rollover risk technically also includes the risk that the refinancing cost will be higher 
than expected. Id. at 79–80. 
 22 Peter R. Fisher, Thoughts on Debt Sustainability: Supply and Demand Keynote Remarks, in 
IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 87, 99. Peter Fisher served in this posi-
tion in the Department of Treasury from 2001–2003, and is currently the Senior Managing Direc-
tor of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager. See id. at x. 
 23 See generally E.J. McMahon & Fred Siegel, Gotham’s Fiscal Crisis: Lessons Unlearned, 
PUB. INT., Winter 2005, at 96 (discussing New York City’s 1975 financial crisis). 
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ernment creditworthiness.24 That, in turn, could create a devastating feedback 
loop: the reduced perception of creditworthiness could prevent the nation 
from borrowing sufficient new money needed to repay future maturing 
debt—or, at least, increase the cost of that borrowing—thereby further in-
creasing rollover risk and triggering additional defaults and an even larger 
debt crisis.25 
Because rollover risk is such a concern, one might ask why govern-
ments, including the United States, routinely depend on borrowing new mon-
ey to repay their maturing debt. The answer is cost: using short-term debt to 
fund long-term projects is attractive because, if managed to avoid a default, it 
tends to lower the cost of borrowing.26 The interest rate on short-term debt is 
usually lower than that on long-term debt because, other things being equal, it 
is easier to assess a borrower’s ability to repay in the short term than in the 
long term, and long-term debt carries greater interest-rate risk.27 As Monroe 
County learned, however, this cost-saving does not come free of charge: it 
also introduces the threat of rollover risk.28 
Rollover risk effectively arises any time short-term debt is used to fund 
long-term projects.29 Until the project is completed, its revenues may be una-
vailable to repay the short-term debt; thus, the main source of repayment of 
the short-term debt during the project term is the proceeds of newly issued 
short-term debt.30 The shorter the term of the debt, the more often it will ma-
ture and be repayable during the project term, with each maturity presenting a 
separate rollover risk.31 With the rise of the so-called “shadow banking” sys-
                                                                                                                           
 24 Enrica Detragiache, Rational Liquidity Crises in the Sovereign Debt Market: In Search of a 
Theory, 43 IMF STAFF PAPERS 545, 546 (1996). 
 25 Id.; see infra notes 186–189 and accompanying text (explaining why even a mere “tech-
nical” debt default could harm the real economy). 
 26 Roubini, supra note 20 (explaining that the maturity length of treasury debt has decreased 
significantly since the 1990s because it is much less expensive to finance short-term debt than 
longer-term debt). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See id. (explaining that the average rate of maturity for U.S. government bonds has fallen 
sharply since the 1990s and explaining how this contributes to increasing rollover risk). 
 29 See Viral Acharya et al., Rollover Risk and Market Freezes, 66 J. FIN. 1177, 1179 (2011) 
(providing examples of short-term projects that were financed with short-term debt during the 
2007–2008 financial crisis). Economists sometimes refer to the use of short-term debt to fund 
long-term projects as a form of maturity transformation or as an asset-liability mismatch. See id. at 
1177. 
 30 See Brunnermeier, supra note 21, at 91–92 (explaining rollover risk). A similar risk occurs 
in a financial market where there is a growing reliance on short-term repo contracts, in which a 
firm raises capital by selling an asset one day with the promise to repurchase it on a future date at 
a higher price. Id. at 80 (explaining that there is an increasing reliance by investment banks on 
such “overnight financing”). 
 31 See Roubini, supra note 20 (explaining rollover risk and how the average length of U.S. 
debt has decreased rapidly in the last decade). 
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tem—a system of financing outside of traditional banking channels—rollover 
risk is becoming increasingly common, even outside of government fi-
nance.32 
B. Rollover Risk’s Application to U.S. Debt 
The U.S. government relies heavily on short-term debt funding.33 As a 
result, some estimates suggest that the U.S. government has to roll over half 
of its debt every two years.34 A recent article estimates that the U.S. govern-
ment will have to roll over seventy-one percent of its privately held debt over 
the next five years.35 Additionally, the government depends on short-term 
debt to finance the federal budget deficit—which was $1.1 trillion in 2012.36 
So long as the United States maintains a large deficit funded by the issuance 
of short-term debt, it creates a risk of being unable to raise the funding neces-
sary to avoid default.37 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Acharya et al., supra note 29, at 1179 (explaining how rollover risk contributed to the 
failure of Bear-Stearns, a global investment bank, in March 2008). Because shadow banking al-
lows for financing outside of traditional banking channels, it also avoids the need for traditional 
modes of bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds. Brunnermeier, 
supra note 21, at 79; see Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on 
Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 425 (2012) (using the term “securitized banking system” rather than 
“shadow banking system”). It includes, for example, asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”) 
conduits and structured investment vehicles (“SIVs”), which routinely issue short-term commer-
cial paper to invest in financial assets having long-term maturities. Brunnermeier, supra note 21, 
at 79. Rollover risk is also present in the practice of repo lending, whereby one party purports to 
sell a financial asset (typically a security) to another party and promises to “repurchase” the asset 
at a later time. See SCOTT BESLEY & EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCE 29 (4th ed., 
2008) (defining “repo lending”). See generally Gorton & Metrick, supra (explaining that repo 
agreements contributed to creating the shadow banking equivalent of a bank run during the 2008 
financial crisis). 
 33 John H. Cochrane, Professor of Fin., Univ. of Chi., Address at Second Annual Roundtable 
on Treasury Markets and Debt Management, Department of the Treasury: Having Your Cake and 
Eating it Too: The Maturity Structure of US Debt 2 (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://faculty.
chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/Maturity_of_debt.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
0EAtnFaKxe3. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Caroline Baum, Four Numbers Add Up to an American Debt Disaster, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 
28, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-28/four-numbers-add-up-to-an-
american-debt-disaster.html, archived at http://perma.cc/04XDX1HGcWQ. 
 36 Rollover Roulette, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2010, at 88, 90–91 (explaining the risks associated 
with short-term financing of debt and how countries such as the United States are attempting to 
mitigate those risks); Annie Lowrey, U.S. Reports $1.1 Trillion Deficit in ’12, a Reduction, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2012, at A16; Roubini, supra note 20. 
 37 Roubini, supra note 20. In other words, deficit spending is putting the U.S. government at 
the mercy of its creditors. Id.; cf. Paolo Manasse et al., Predicting Sovereign Debt Crises 4, 26 
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 03/221, 2003) (finding that historically high illiquidity, 
especially as measured by the use of short-term debt, is associated with a high probability of enter-
ing a debt crisis). 
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Policy responses to the expanding shadow-banking system might also 
increase government rollover risk. A senior advisor to the U.S. Treasury re-
cently argued, for example, that the financial crisis revealed a problem of 
“excessive private money-creation in response to an insufficient supply of 
[U.S.] Treasury bills.”38 In other words, investors demanded shadow-banking 
investments as a comparable short-term financing option because of a short-
age of Treasury bills. A “simple solution to this problem,” this senior advisor 
contended, would be to “increase the supply of Treasury bills.”39 Such a solu-
tion would attract funding away from risky investments and into U.S. debt 
securities.40 The downside, however, is that issuing more Treasury bills 
would create more “rollover risk[] from the system migrating from the (shad-
ow) banking system to the balance sheet of the [United States].”41 
Ongoing political disputes over the federal debt ceiling further exacer-
bate rollover risk by limiting the amount of new debt that can be issued to 
repay maturing debt.42 Prior to 1939, Congress—which under the Constitu-
tion has the authority “to borrow money on the credit of the United States”43 
—micromanaged the types and amounts of debt securities that the Treasury 
could issue. The debt ceiling was introduced in 1939 as a constraint on the 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Zoltan Pozsar, A Macro View of Shadow Banking: Do T-Bill Shortages Pose a New Triffin 
Dilemma?, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 35, 41. The term “U.S. 
Treasury securities,” sometimes abbreviated as “U.S. Treasuries,” refers to debt securities of the 
U.S. government. See Treasury Securities & Programs, TREASURYDIRECT, http://www.treasury
direct.gov/indiv/products/products.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/0kLcyu99Hua (last visited Jan. 
14, 2014) (providing a summary of the different types of U.S. Treasury securities). Treasury bills are 
short-term U.S. Treasury securities. Neil Irwin, What’s Happening in the Treasury Bill Market Today 
Should Terrify You, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Oct. 8, 2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/08/whats-happening-in-the-treasury-bill-market-today-should-
terrify-you/, archived at http://perma.cc/0SQwhr7TzFo (explaining that Treasury bills are “issued 
for 30, 60, or 90 days”). 
 39 Pozsar, supra note 38, at 42. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. The senior advisor nonetheless believes that, notwithstanding such “increased [govern-
ment] rollover risk[],” the externalities would be “less costly and disruptive” than the systemic 
danger to the economy that would result by allowing the increase of risky private investments. Id. 
at 43. 
 42 See Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Boehner Urges G.O.P. Solidarity in ‘Epic Battle,’ 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2013, at A1 (demonstrating that political disputes might lead to questions as 
to whether Congress will cooperate to raise the debt ceiling in time to avoid a default). This as-
sumes, of course, that enough other debt was issued since the maturing debt was issued so that the 
federal debt limit would be faced. Even given that assumption, however, I would argue that addi-
tional new debt should be issued if its proceeds to “simultaneously” repay the maturing debt, be-
cause—repayment and interest cost aside—that issuance would not create a net increase in out-
standing debt. 
 43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
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U.S. Treasury, which was then delegated limited congressional authority to 
manage the issuance of national debt.44 
At first blush, the federal debt ceiling does not seem especially problem-
atic because it is artificial and can be raised by Congress to avoid default.45 In 
fact, Congress has modified the debt ceiling over ninety times since 1940,46 
and at least ten times since 2001.47 History reveals, however, that not all of 
these modifications are passed in a timely manner. Most notably, on April 26, 
1979 the federal debt ceiling prevented the U.S. government from borrowing 
sufficient funds to repay its maturing debt, thereby triggering a default.48 The 
government also defaulted on its debt coming due on May 3rd and 10th of 
that year, in part due to the debt ceiling.49 
On several other occasions, the failure to timely modify the federal debt 
ceiling pushed the government close to default, adding to the uncertainty that 
the government will in fact repay its short-term commitments. Congress and 
the executive branch of the government failed to reach a timely agreement 
regarding the federal debt ceiling in 1985 and again between October 1995 
and March 1996.50 One of these failures prompted the rating agency Standard 
& Poor’s to issue a warning that “the standoff was adversely affecting the 
credibility of the U.S. Treasury in the world market.”51 Moody’s Investors 
Service (Moody’s) also announced that it was considering downgrading the 
credit rating of $387 billion of U.S. Treasury debt.52 An examination of the 
yield spreads between corporate commercial paper and Treasury bills of the 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Richard Sylla, U.S. Government Debt Has Always Been Different!, in IS U.S. GOVERN-
MENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 1, 11. 
 45 Michael W. McConnell, Origins of the Fiscal Constitution, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT 
DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 45, 48. Because the debt ceiling is denominated in dollars, not per-
centage of national income, it is effectively lowered by inflation over time unless Congress in-
creases it. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Op-
tion: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
1175, 1187 (2012). 
 46 McConnell, supra note 45, at 48. 
 47 D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31967, THE DEBT 
LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 1 (2013). 
 48 Terry L. Zivney & Richard D. Marcus, The Day the United States Defaulted on Treasury 
Bills, 24 FIN. REV. 475, 475 (1989). 
 49 Id. The government’s delay in paying that debt was due to the large number of small inves-
tors holding the debt and the failure of word-processing equipment used to prepare check sched-
ules. Id.; see infra notes 180–184 and accompanying text (discussing the economic harm caused 
by these defaults). 
 50 McConnell, supra note 45, at 48. 
 51 Srinivas Nippani et al., Are Treasury Securities Free of Default?, 36 J. FIN. & QUANT. 
ANALYSIS 251, 252 (2001); cf. Robert Hurtado, Debt Ceiling Impasse Dampens Bond Prices, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at A40 (explaining how the political uncertainty affected bond pric-
es). 
 52 Nippani et al., supra note 51, at 252. 
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same maturities found that spreads narrowed during this crisis, indicating that 
the market charged a default-risk premium on the Treasury bills.53 
Debt-ceiling standoffs typically arise when different parties control the 
Presidency and at least one house of Congress,54 and appear to be the result of 
fundamental disagreements over the federal government’s size and role.55 A 
debt ceiling “crisis” occurred in 2011, for example, when certain members of 
Congress attempted to use the debt ceiling to force the Obama administration 
to accept spending cuts.56 Even more recently, in 2013, the Republican major-
ity in Congress conditioned any raise in the debt ceiling on spending “cuts 
and reforms.”57 As a result, Congress was able to reach a debt ceiling agree-
ment only on the eve of a default, creating speculation that the United States 
might actually default on some of its debt.58 As long as these types of funda-
mental disagreements exist, members of Congress may well continue to 
“play[] politics” with the debt ceiling and push the nation, at times, uncom-
fortably close to default.59 
II. HOW COULD A U.S. DEBT DEFAULT BE AVOIDED? 
Because rollover risk makes a U.S. debt default more likely, the govern-
ment should pay greater attention to managing that risk. As a senior advisor to 
the U.S. Treasury observed, “[p]roposing that public debt management should 
incorporate considerations other than minimizing the cost of debt issuance may 
sound radical . . . .”60 Nonetheless, in light of the increasing rollover risk, “cen-
tral banks today [including the U.S. Federal Reserve] [should] have an equally 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. Yield spreads measure the relative investment risk between two (or more) debt securi-
ties. See id. at 254. 
 54 McConnell, supra note 45, at 48. 
 55 See Nippani et al., supra note 51, at 252. 
 56 McConnell, supra note 45, at 48 (using the term “crisis”); Glenn Kessler, Explaining the Debt 
Ceiling Debate, WASH. POST BLOG (June 29, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/fact-checker/post/explaining-the-debt-ceiling-debate/2011/06/28/AGVM80pH_blog.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/0QDcXTeynYL. 
 57 Ashley Parker, Boehner Sees Showdown Over Raising Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 
2013, at A17 (reporting that the Secretary of the Treasury warned Congress that the United States 
would reach its borrowing limit in mid-October 2013 and would likely be unable to pay all of its 
bills without raising the debt ceiling). 
 58 Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Shutdown Is Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, at A1 
(explaining that Congress approved an increase in the debt ceiling within a day of the Treasury 
running out of money to pay its obligations and that the agreement also ended a sixteen-day gov-
ernment shutdown caused by Congress’s inability to reach an agreement over a spending bill). 
 59 Kessler, supra note 56. But see Annie Lowrey, Lingering Confusion in Debt Ceiling’s 
Temporary Fix, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2013, at B3 (explaining that the debt ceiling bill passed in 
October 2013 included a “default prevention” section, which allows President Obama to unilater-
ally increase the debt ceiling until February 7, 2014). 
 60 Pozsar, supra note 38, at 43. 
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important mandate of focusing on financial stability . . . .”61 The discussion 
below illustrates the U.S. government’s considerable, though not unlimited, 
flexibility to exercise that mandate. 
A. Monetizing the Debt 
One route to minimizing rollover risk would be through monetizing the 
country’s debt. “Monetizing” the debt is a somewhat vague term, referring to 
monetary steps—including quantitative easing and printing money—that the 
government can take for the sole purpose of facilitating its debt payment.62 
This is in contrast to monetary steps taken for other purposes, such as achiev-
ing price stability or maximizing economic growth.63 
1. Quantitative Easing 
Quantitative easing (“QE”) is the most popular way to monetize gov-
ernment debt, and indeed the terms “monetizing the debt” and “QE” are often 
used interchangeably.64 QE is generally defined as a policy that, unconven-
tionally, increases the monetary base with the goals of reducing the cost of 
government debt and increasing liquidity.65 
Typically, a central bank engages in QE by instituting a lending program 
or purchasing financial assets, including government securities.66 In the Unit-
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. One may query how that mandate would parse with the Federal Reserve’s “dual man-
date” to “promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate 
long-term interest rates.” Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012). Furthermore, it may be 
difficult to reach an optimal tradeoff between rollover risk and interest-rate cost on government 
debt. Cf. E-mail from Deborah J. Lucas, Sloan Distinguished Professor of Fin., Mass. Inst. of 
Tech., to author (Aug. 28, 2013) (on file with author) (observing that “it is difficult to specify 
what the tradeoff function between higher rates and liquidity benefits should be”). 
 62 Mike Shortridge, QE4: Monetizing the Debt with No Possible Exit, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 24, 
2012), http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/politics-blue-collar/2012/dec/24/qe
4-monetizing-debt-no-possible-exit/, archived at http://perma.cc/0tE5pDKjMYa. 
 63 Daniel L. Thornton, Monetizing the Debt, ECON. SYNOPSES, May 19, 2010, at 1, 1 (ex-
plaining that in a growing economy, the money supply must expand over time in order to promote 
stability and maximum economic growth). A possible—albeit overly broad—definition of mone-
tizing debt is the use of “money creation” to permanently finance deficit spending. See David 
Andolfatto & Li Li, Is the Fed Monetizing Government Debt?, ECON. SYNOPSES, Feb. 1, 2013, at 
1, 1 (using this definition). 
 64 See Andolfatto & Li, supra note 63, at 1 (using the term “monetizing the debt” to describe 
quantitative easing). 
 65 Brett W. Fawley & Christopher J. Neely, Four Stories of Quantitative Easing, 95 FED. RES. 
BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 51, 52–53 (2013). The monetary base consists of both currency and 
reserves in the economy. Id. at 53. 
 66 Id. at 52; Stephanie Flanders, Is Quantitative Easing Really Just Printing Money?, BBC 
NEWS BLOG (Feb. 18, 2009, 12:59 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/stephanie
 
2014] Rollover Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt Default 11 
ed States, the Federal Reserve System (the “Fed”) engages in QE by buying 
U.S. Treasury securities indirectly.67 The Fed pays for these securities with 
reserves it creates “by a stroke of the pen,”68 which some consider the “effec-
tive equivalent of money printing.”69 
This process reduces the government’s cost of borrowing: although the 
Treasury continues to pay interest to the Fed on its debt, the Treasury will not 
have to repay the principal as it would to an outside investor.70 QE also in-
creases U.S. government liquidity.71 That reduction in cost and increased li-
                                                                                                                           
flanders/2009/02/obtaining-the-right-to-print-m.html, archived at http://perma.cc/0ci4t9mDkC8 
(discussing government securities). 
 67 See Marshall Gittler, Why Quantitative Easing Isn’t Printing Money, CNBC (May 23, 
2013, 3:31 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100760150, archived at http://perma.cc/J9DE-SWNH 
(explaining how the Fed uses QE in the United States); Quantitative Easing Explained, BANK OF 
ENG., http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/pages/qe/default.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8QYX-UVK2 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (explaining QE in the United Kingdom). 
The Fed typically buys securities from commercial banks and other private institutions because it 
may not legally purchase securities from the Treasury directly. See Thornton, supra note 63, at 2; 
see also 12 U.S.C. § 355 (2012). It appears that central banks are often prohibited, under national 
law, from purchasing debt directly from the government. Flanders, supra note 66 (noting that the 
Bank of Japan and Bank of England are both legally forbidden to buy debt directly from their own 
governments). 
 68 Bob Eisenbeis, Three Myths and Misunderstandings, FIN. SENSE (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/bob-eisenbeis/three-myths-misunderstandings, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/H3C-E66J; see Pedro da Costa, The Fallacy of Fed ‘Profits’ (and ‘Loss-
es’), REUTERS BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/macroscope/2013/02/20/the-fallacy-
of-fed-profits-and-losses/, archived at http://perma.cc/03br5tC49Yo. 
 69 Agustino Fontevecchia, Billionaire Paul Singer: The U.S. Has a Big Debt Problem and the 
Fed Is Making It Worse, FORBES (May 8, 2013, 1:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afont
evecchia/2013/05/08/u-s-is-insolvent-banks-sitting-on-trillions-in-derivatives-we-cant-see-and-qe-
money-printing-is-making-it-worse-singer-at-ira-sohn/, archived at http://perma.cc/0QEfh8zyzZQ; 
see Eisenbeis, supra note 68. Simplistically, QE can be viewed as the Fed issuing Federal Reserve 
liabilities in exchange for Treasury debt, thereby effectively moving sovereign debt from the Treas-
ury’s balance sheet to that of the Fed. Eisenbeis, supra note 68 (“Looking at the Fed’s portfolio of 
securities from the perspective of the nation’s consolidated balance sheet, we see that one form of 
government debt (Treasury debt) is taken out of circulation and replaced with another form of gov-
ernment debt (Federal Reserve liabilities).”). 
 70 See QE, or Not QE?, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2012, at 66, 66 (explaining QE). By purchasing 
Treasury securities, some argue that the Fed also gives the appearance of increasing investor de-
mand for those securities without real money being paid, which in turn drives down the govern-
ment’s cost of borrowing by lowering the interest rate payable on Treasury securities. See id. 
 71 See da Costa, supra note 68. QE increases government liquidity by taking U.S. government 
debt out of circulation and replacing it with Federal Reserve liabilities that do not necessarily have 
to be paid. See id. When the Fed purchases U.S. Treasury securities, the debt evidenced by those 
securities is taken out of circulation and “effectively retired.” Id. The Treasury continues, howev-
er, to pay the Fed interest, from which the Fed extracts its expenses and dividend payments and 
returns the remainder to the Treasury. Id. But cf. Gavyn Davies, Will Central Banks Cancel Gov-
ernment Debt?, FIN. TIMES BLOG (Oct. 14, 2012, 3:27 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/gavyndavies/
2012/10/14/will-central-banks-cancel-government-debt/?, archived at http://perma.cc/WE2K-UX3T 
(arguing that the purchased Treasury securities are “parked . . . temporarily” at the Fed, only to be 
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quidity can at least marginally help to avoid a U.S. debt default. But QE is not 
a real-time remedy that can instantly generate funds to refinance maturing 
debt. Moreover, QE can be costly, sparking inflation if banks use their new-
found reserves to increase lending.72 
2. Printing Money 
Although QE can be considered the effective equivalent of printing 
money,73 the U.S. government can also literally print money to pay its debt, 
thereby avoiding default.74 The government has this flexibility—indeed, it 
                                                                                                                           
sold back to the private sector in the future). Another argument as to why QE increases govern-
ment liquidity is that by lowering the government’s cost of borrowing, QE can encourage banks to 
lend, firms to invest, and individuals to consume. See Fawley & Neely, supra note 65, at 51; da 
Costa, supra note 68. In this way, QE can influence the economy’s level of output and employ-
ment. See Fawley & Neely, supra note 65, at 51. An increase in output and employment can then 
raise tax revenues and provide the government with more money to pay its debts. See id. at 72 
(explaining how a financial crisis negatively affects a government’s ability to raise taxes and pay 
its national debt). The connection between interest rates and government liquidity, however, is not 
without risk. Chris Isidore, Is the Fed Playing with Fire?, CNNMONEY (Oct. 5, 2010, 4:05 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/05/news/economy/Fed_quantitative_easing/index.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/04p5BxrdVw1 (highlighting some negative side effects of QE, including a decline 
in the value of the dollar, which in turn could cause interest rates to rise). 
 72 Gittler, supra note 67 (arguing that QE is not necessarily inflationary because the amount 
of reserves a bank has is only one factor in determining whether or not to increase lending). QE 
might also raise questions of securities fraud. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–78pp (2006). Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for example, criminaliz-
es employing “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013) (authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 78j). This provi-
sion has been used to punish market manipulation in which companies buy and sell their own 
securities in order to affect the market price. Manuel A. Utset, Fraudulent Corporate Signals: 
Conduct as Securities Fraud, 54 B.C. L. REV. 645, 698–99 (2013) (explaining that “Section 10(b) 
prohibits manipulative and deceptive behavior in connection with the purchase of a sale or securi-
ty”). Arguably, that is partly what the government itself does if QE has the effect of increasing the 
appearance of investor demand for Treasury securities. See supra note 70 and accompanying text 
(explaining that QE potentially has the effect of driving up demand for government securities). 
The counterargument, however, is that because the Fed’s QE operations are disclosed, the market 
should not falsely perceive investor demand. 
 73 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (explaining that like printing money, QE increas-
es the amount of currency in circulation). 
 74 Herring, supra note 16, at 22 (explaining that “[governments] can almost always print 
enough domestic currency to service their debts in a timely manner”); see also Catherine New, 
Could the U.S. Print Its Way Out of the Debt Crisis?, DAILYFINANCE (July 28, 2011, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/07/28/could-the-u-s-print-its-way-out-of-the-debt-crisis/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/0msBSkYVpgX (explaining how printing money could enable the Unit-
ed States to repay its debt but also highlighting the risk of inflation that could accompany this 
solution). 
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has the flexibility generally to monetize its debt—because the U.S. dollar is a 
major reserve currency, and is therefore in high demand.75 
Just as with QE and other forms of monetizing its debt, the U.S. gov-
ernment would face negative consequences, such as inflation, that would re-
sult from printing money to pay its debt. Inflation can also motivate investors 
to demand higher interest rates, which would “balloon the cost of servicing 
the federal debt.”76 The former president of the Kansas City Federal Reserve 
has even argued that the inflation resulting from printing money to pay U.S. 
debt could threaten American living standards as well as destroy the Fed’s 
independence and credibility.77 
Moreover, the government’s flexibility to print money or otherwise 
monetize its debt to avoid default could change.78 The U.S. dollar could, for 
example, lose its role as the international reserve currency, thereby making it 
harder, or at least more inflationary, to sell dollars.79 Reserve currencies have 
been displaced before. The pound sterling was the world’s first major reserve 
currency, but the U.S. dollar began to dominate after World War I.80 Since the 
U.S. dollar’s rise, several countries have attempted to replace it with their 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Herring, supra note 16, at 25–28 (discussing the role of the dollar in the international econ-
omy). Because the U.S. dollar is the benchmark for world prices and is used to settle cross-border 
trades, there is a unique demand for dollars: countries need to keep stores of dollar reserves, both 
as a float and to bolster confidence in their own currencies. Climbing Greenback Mountain, 
ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2011, at 12, 13. 
 76 Patrice Hill, Induced Inflation Feared as a Way to Cut Debt, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2010), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/19/induced-inflation-feared-as-way-to-cut-
debt/?page=all, archived at http://perma.cc/X2UK-8XWU  (quoting Alice Rivlin, the former di-
rector of the Congressional Budget Office); see also Peter S. Goodman, Printing Money—and Its 
Price, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at WK1 (discussing other negative consequences of inflation, 
including a declining dollar resulting in more expensive imported goods and demand for increased 
interest rates among foreign borrowers, which will prompt increased interest rates for home and 
automobile buyers, and business and credit card holders). But cf. Herring, supra note 16, at 22 
(explaining that increasing inflation can make it easier for the government, as debtor, to repay debt 
that has fixed principal and interest). 
 77 Hill, supra note 76 (quoting Thomas Hoenig). 
 78 See Herring, supra note 16, at 25–28 (explaining that the dollar is currently used as reserve 
currency but that this could change). 
 79 See id. at 28–29 (describing the threats to the dollar’s status as the leading reserve curren-
cy). In theory, any nation can monetize its debt—or at least debt payable in the nation’s curren-
cy—by printing money, but doing so necessarily increases the money supply and so causes infla-
tion. Id. at 22–23 (explaining that countries that are especially adverse to inflation might prefer a 
default rather than the inflation that would be triggered by printing money). If the currency is a 
major reserve currency—as the U.S. dollar currently is—the natural supply of that currency would 
be larger than the supply of a non-major reserve currency. See id. at 25 (explaining that the United 
States enjoys an “extra degree of freedom” in its ability to print money “because of the interna-
tional role of the dollar”). Therefore, the inflationary effect caused by printing the money needed 
to pay the nation’s debt would be smaller than if the nation did not have a major reserve currency. 
See id. 
 80 Id. at 26. 
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currency: Japan and the euro zone of the European Union both have hoped 
their respective currencies might serve as the principal reserve currency.81 
In the future, the Chinese renminbi (also called yuan) may pose a real 
threat to the U.S. dollar’s status. The Chinese government has already taken 
steps towards enhancing the renminbi’s international role, giving most com-
panies the right to pay for imports in renminbi and allowing many companies 
to sell exports for renminbi.82 To replace the U.S. dollar, however, China 
would have to abandon many of its current policies, like artificially setting the 
renminbi exchange rate.83 
B. Asset Sales 
The U.S. government could also consider selling assets as part of its 
debt-reduction measures. This could even include the “monetization” of fu-
ture tax revenues or quasi-production payments of mineral rights.84 Some 
experts argue, for example, that “[s]overeigns can almost always sell suffi-
cient assets to service their debts.”85 
That assumes, of course, that those sales could be made on a timely 
enough basis to pay maturing debt, which may not always be possible. As 
part of its proposed bailout, for example, Greece was required to sell assets to 
raise funds in accordance with specified deadlines.86 But as of June 2013, 
Greece was still struggling to attract buyers for assets like its natural gas 
company and its grid-operating subsidiary.87 The IMF has called Greece’s 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. at 29. 
 82 Id. at 32–33. 
 83 Id. at 33. 
 84 See Jim Millstein, Burning the Furniture to Heat the Home—The Potential Role of Asset 
Sales in Funding the Federal Government’s Deficits, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, 
supra note 1, at 151, 163, 167 (explaining that the U.S. government’s assets likely amounted to $4 
trillion in 2011 and concluding that the United States should consider using the sale of its assets as 
a debt solution). 
 85 Herring, supra note 16, at 23. 
 86 Millstein, supra note 84, at 162 (explaining that Portugal and Ireland were also required to 
sell assets). 
 87 Greece Dismisses Fears of Funding Gap from Asset Sale Delays, REUTERS (June 25, 2013, 
1:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/25/greece-funding-idUSL5N0F13HX20130625, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7DNB-23JT (discussing Greece’s difficultly in securing buyers for na-
tional assets, such as its national gas company); Christos Ziotis, Greek Asset-Sales Plan Dealt Blow 
as Gazprom Declines Depa Bid, BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2013-06-10/greek-asset-sales-plan-dealt-blow-as-gazprom-declines-depa-bid.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/0XPfL7vmeUY (discussing Greece’s difficulty in securing buyers for its 
grid operating company, Desfa SA and its gas monopoly, Depa SA). 
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progress “extremely disappointing,”88 as Greece has been able to raise only a 
fraction of its target from the sale of government assets since 2010.89 
The United States may face similar problems if it attempts to raise funds 
quickly through asset sales; it may be difficult to attract sufficient investors, 
and increasing the supply of (non-unique) assets relative to a fixed demand 
will likely decrease the return on assets sold.90 In addition to these difficul-
ties, asset sales may well be politically unpopular, like “mortgaging the fu-
ture.” 
C. Limits on Avoiding Default 
Notwithstanding all this flexibility, there are additional limits on the 
ability to avoid a U.S. national debt default. These limits include the possibil-
ity that the magnitude of the problem could be too large for the United States 
to fix on its own.91 A related possibility is that estimates about the size of the 
U.S. debt might understate the magnitude of the problem because those esti-
mates fail to consider hidden liabilities.92 
1. The Problem Could Be Too Large 
An obvious limit is that the problem could simply be too large. A large 
increase in the size of government debt and the resulting magnitude of the 
problems posed by it could be triggered, for example, by a problem in the 
private sector that would require a massive U.S. government intervention to 
prevent a systemic collapse.93 The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in 2010, attempts 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Ziotis, supra note 87. 
 89 Harry Papachristou, Update 1—Greece PM Pleads for Some Slack in Latest EU/IMF In-
spection, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2013, 11:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/18/
greece-bailout-idUSL5N0HE2CT20130918, archived at http://perma.cc/Z53L-K2ZE (explaining 
that “Greece has clinched privatization deals worth 3.6 billion euros since its bailout started in 
2010, compared with an initial target to raise 22 billion euros over that period”); Robin Wiggles-
worth & Kerin Hope, Greek Asset Sales Behind Target, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012, 7:43 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e91b970e-4b63-11e1-b980-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2YSsQUCgf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/PPS3-E7FZ (explaining that it has been difficult to attract investors to 
buy Greece’s assets). 
 90 Millstein, supra note 84, at 162 (“However, states do not part with assets lightly, in particu-
lar with land and mineral rights. National pride in ownership can be a large obstacle, as can securi-
ty and environmental concerns.”). 
 91 See infra notes 93–101 and accompanying text (explaining that the size of the U.S. debt 
could rapidly increase). 
 92 See infra notes 102–110 and accompanying text (explaining the use of special purpose 
entities). 
 93 See Comment to Shortridge, supra note 62 (“[W]hat I see truly driving us over the ‘real’ 
cliff is the bond bubble bursting, spiking interest rates, and causing a massive crash in the deriva-
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to mitigate this risk.94 It limits the Fed’s ability to act as a lender of last resort, 
and it requires systemically important financial institutions to draw up “living 
wills” that specify how they could liquidate, if needed, with minimal systemic 
impact.95 But in the author’s experience as a bankruptcy lawyer, it is rare that 
a firm is able to accurately predict during good times what might happen dur-
ing bad times. It therefore appears that the Fed will ultimately face the need to 
act as a lender of last resort at least in some cases.96 
Moreover, because it is possible that the Fed will eventually need to act 
as a lender of last resort, the Dodd-Frank Act’s limitations on the Fed’s ability 
to act in that capacity may well be “penny-wise but pound-foolish.” A sys-
temically important financial institution could end up defaulting, with system-
ic consequences, precisely because the Fed is unable to act as a lender of last 
resort.97 The cost of trying to address those systemic consequences could it-
self “bankrupt” the country. 
The Dodd-Frank Act also ignores the systemic implications of financial 
markets themselves.98 In today’s era of increasing disintermediation, financial 
markets can be triggers and transmitters of systemic risk. For example, the 
recent financial crisis was at least partly market driven.99 Subprime mortgage 
loans had been bundled together as collateral to partially support the payment 
of mortgage-backed securities.100 When home prices began falling, some of 
the mortgage-backed securities began defaulting or were downgraded, there-
by destroying investor confidence in debt ratings and causing debt markets 
more broadly to collapse.101 If financial markets collapse with systemic con-
sequences, the cost of trying to address those consequences could, again, 
“bankrupt” the country. 
                                                                                                                           
tives market. i [sic] don’t see uncle sam [sic] printing up $70 trillion to cover the [derivatives] 
exposure of just JP Morgan . . . .”). 
 94 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101, 13 U.S.C. § 343 
(2012) (limiting the Fed’s ability to act as a lender of last resort); see Dodd-Frank Act § 165, 12 
U.S.C. § 5365 (2012) (requiring living wills). 
 95 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the 
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 106, 113 (2013). 
 96 See id. at 105–06. 
 97 Id. at 106 (“Perversely, Dodd-Frank’s limitation has actually increased the risk that an 
important financial firm will collapse, with systemic consequences.”). 
 98 See id. at 130–31 (explaining how the Dodd-Frank Act limits the ability of the Treasury 
Department and the Fed to rescue failing firms, even where their failure may have system-wide 
consequences for the nation’s economy). 
 99 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 
WIS. L. REV. 815, 817 (explaining how the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 was triggered by 
“the collapse of the market for mortgage-backed securities”). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
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2. Special-Purpose Entities and Hidden Debt 
There is also an insidious problem of hidden debt. In the United States, 
both federal and state government is increasingly operated and financed 
through government-sponsored special-purpose entities (“SPEs”).102 Originally, 
SPEs were used to bypass restrictions on government borrowing, such as debt 
limits and jurisdiction limitation; however, SPEs increasingly resemble those 
used by corporations as a tool to raise off-balance-sheet financing.103 For ex-
ample, some states establish “enterprises,” which are funded by revenue 
bonds, “repayable solely from the profits of the enterprise.”104 Theoretically, 
the state allocates the risk of these enterprises failing to be profitable to inves-
tors without allowing “legal recourse to the state’s general funds or tax reve-
nues.”105 
In the United States, the debt of government-sponsored SPEs is rarely 
disclosed as debt of the government because the government is not legally 
liable on that debt, either directly or as a guarantor.106 Nonetheless, because a 
default by one of these entities could destroy the reputation and debt rating of 
its government sponsor, there are numerous precedents indicating that the 
government will routinely support its sponsored SPEs—even though it is not 
legally obligated to do so.107 Indeed, the U.S. government stepped in to sup-
port the debt of its government-sponsored SPEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
in the recent financial crisis, notwithstanding that such debt was not legally 
the government’s obligation.108 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 369, 370–72 (2012) (explaining that some states, including New York and Virgin-
ia, issue almost all of their debt through SPEs). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 375. 
 105 Id. (explaining that investors are presumably rewarded for taking on this risk by the prom-
ise of receiving higher interest on their bonds). 
 106 Id. at 379 (“Occasionally, state SPE debt is shown in a separate column [on the state’s 
balance sheet] as indebtedness of the state’s ‘component units.’”). 
 107 Id. at 381–83. States have strong economic incentives to stand behind SPE debt. Id. at 318. 
For example, defaulting on SPE debt could “signal uncertainty as to whether the state will pay its 
debts generally.” Id. Other reasons for states to pay their SPE debt include the important function 
of SPE operations in supporting government services, honoring a moral obligation, and generally 
protecting the state’s reputation. Id. at 381–82. 
 108 Id. at 382 (explaining that the U.S. government supported Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
debt in order to enhance stability in the housing market). Other U.S. government-sponsored SPEs 
include, for example, the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), other “public benefit corpora-
tions,” and “SPEs used to finance military aircraft.” See Steven L. Schwarcz, Direct and Indirect 
U.S. Government Debt, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 245, 250–51. 
In the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, Congress endowed the newly formed Federal Hous-
ing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) with a variety of mechanisms to strengthen the housing SPEs. See 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4511 (2012) (giving the FHFA supervisory and 
 
18 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1 
Compounding this problem is the reality that if the United States had to 
step in to support the debt of its states, the amounts at issue could be huge.109 
Although state finances are generally improving, that improvement ignores 
the massive amounts of state SPE debt—which, in many states, is much larg-
er than the state’s general obligation debt.110 If states have to step in to sup-
port their SPE debt, the federal government, in turn, may be forced to step in 
to support the states’ debt to keep them from defaulting. 
III. WHAT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A DEFAULT? 
A U.S. debt default would have severe consequences. This Part exam-
ines both the legal and economic consequences of a default. First, Section A 
explains that a default could raise constitutional challenges, based on the 
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.111 Notwith-
standing those challenges, these legal claims would have to overcome several 
procedural hurdles such as sovereign immunity, the need to establish a reme-
dy, and challenges enforcing a judgment.112 Section B then explains how a 
default would entail severe economic risks for the United States.113 
                                                                                                                           
regulatory authority over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and the Office 
of Finance). Under that authority, the government purchased approximately $154 billion of securi-
ties issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ensure that these SPEs were solvent. The Budgetary 
Cost of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and Options for the Future Federal Role in the Secondary 
Mortgage Market: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement 
of Deborah Lucas, Assistant Director for Financial Analysis, Congressional Budget Office). These 
purchases were made despite the U.S. government having no legal obligation to repay the debt of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 
1019, 1023 (2008) (explaining that “[i]n creating Fannie and Freddie, it appears at first glance that 
the federal government disavowed any guarantee of the two companies’ obligations,” but 
“[d]espite this seemingly clear language, Wall Street believe[d] that the federal government would 
bail [them] out if they were to become insolvent”). 
 109 Schwarcz, supra note 102, at 370 (“Virtually all states obtain at least a portion of their 
public financing through SPEs.”). 
 110 Id. (providing the examples of New York, New Jersey, and Virginia, which obtain most of 
their financing through SPEs). 
 111 See infra notes 114–133 and accompanying text. 
 112 See infra notes 134–165 and accompanying text. 
 113 See infra notes 175–194 and accompanying text. 
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A. Legal Consequences 
1. Constitutional Issues 
 Incongruously, although a U.S. debt default is possible, it might not be 
legal.114 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “The validity of the public debt of 
the United States . . . shall not be questioned.”115 This provision was original-
ly included in the Constitution to prevent a southern Democratic majority 
from repudiating Civil War debts.116 Despite the provision’s history, most 
believe—and in 1935, in Perry v. United States, the Supreme Court conclud-
ed—that it applies generally, not just to Civil War debts.117 
It remains unclear, however, whether “question[ing]” the “validity” of 
U.S. debt would include defaulting on such debt.118 Some argue that the scope 
of the Fourteenth Amendment should include that, and that it should even 
include governmental action that could lead to default.119 Others argue, how-
ever, that a payment default should not be interpreted as questioning, or repu-
diating, the validity of U.S. debt.120 One leading scholar explained the distinc-
tion: “Default is not the same as repudiation. If Congress repudiated the debt, 
it would be declaring that the debt is not owed. If Congress defaulted on the 
debt, the [debt] would still be owed; it would simply go (in part) unpaid.”121 
On the other hand, a prominent bankruptcy practitioner questions 
whether the distinction between validity and default is truly meaningful in the 
context of U.S. government debt: “Obligations of the sovereign can be en-
                                                                                                                           
 114 McConnell, supra note 45, at 49 (explaining that default was most likely constitutional 
before the Fourteenth Amendment was passed but afterwards is arguably unconstitutional). 
 115 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. 
 116 McConnell, supra note 45, at 49–50. 
 117 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935). For a brief discussion of Perry, see Michael Abramowicz, Note, 
Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561, 602–05 (1997). 
 118 See Abramowicz, supra note 117, at 590. 
 119 Id. at 590, 592. Under these broad interpretations, courts might have the power to deem U.S. 
government actions, or inaction, unconstitutional if they pose a threat to creditors. Michael Stern, 
“Arrest Me. I Question the Validity of the Public Debt,” POINT OF ORDER (June 2, 2011, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.pointoforder.com/2011/06/02/arrest-me-i-question-the-validity-of-the-public-debt/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/0Zx6HQ6yRk5. 
 120 Stern, supra note 119 (“If the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wanted to say that the 
government should take no action that would jeopardize the repayment of debt, surely there were 
more straightforward ways of saying so.”); see Jackson, supra note 16, at 60 (stating that “it is not 
at all clear that the temporary delay of debt service constitutes questioning of the public debt of 
the sort that the Public Debt Clause proscribed . . . .”); McConnell, supra note 45, at 50 (differen-
tiating between defaulting on debt and repudiation of debt). 
 121 McConnell, supra note 45, at 50. 
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forced only at the sovereign’s own sufferance, so the validity of the debt and 
the debt’s enforceability merge to become a single concept.”122 
Assuming that a payment default would violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, what does that mean for the government’s ability to default? If the gov-
ernment does not have money to pay the debt on a timely basis, the constitu-
tionality of default might prove irrelevant. Where the government has no real 
choice but to violate the Constitution, it may arguably be “freed from consti-
tutional constraint,” at least where it did not create the problem leading to the 
default.123 Of course, that begs the question of what constitutes a choice; for 
example, would the government’s decision to default rather than to pay the 
debt by printing money—at the cost of inflation—be a real choice?124 And if 
it were construed as a real choice, would a court then have the authority to 
order the government to print the money to avoid default? Would the gov-
ernment even have to comply with that order? These are unresolved ques-
tions. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the constitutionality 
of state-government debt defaults might help inform the answers. In the mid-
to-late 1800s, several states defaulted, renegotiated, or repudiated their debts 
despite arguably violating Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution (the 
“Contract Clause”), which prohibits states from passing any law “impairing 
the obligation of contracts.”125 Bondholders sued, resulting in a spate of cases 
that purport to turn on the doctrine of sovereign immunity—the principle that 
a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.126 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Donald S. Bernstein, A Comment on Professor Mooney’s Thought Experiment: Can U.S. 
Debt Be Restructured?, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 237, 240. 
Donald Bernstein is a partner and head of the bankruptcy practice of the law firm of Davis, Polk & 
Wardwell LLP. Donald S. Bernstein, DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL LLP, http://www.davispolk.
com/lawyers/donald-bernstein/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2014). 
 123 But see Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 45, at 1218 (arguing that “[w]hile this sentiment is 
somewhat compelling, it is ultimately wrong”). 
 124 See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (explaining the risk that printing money 
could lead to inflation, which could have serious negative consequences for the U.S. economy). 
 125 WILLIAM A. SCOTT, THE REPUDIATION OF STATE DEBTS 4–5 (1969) (explaining the Con-
tract Clause and arguing that Supreme Court decisions clearly show that the Clause applies to 
contracts involving both states and individuals); Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Con-
stitutional Law of State Debt, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 127, 150 (2012) (explain-
ing that when states “delay payments to employees and service providers, they may well find 
themselves in breach of their contractual obligations” and concluding that “[r]epudiation of a 
state’s bonds is surely unconstitutional under the Contract Clause”); Johnson & Young, supra at 
149 (explaining that most of the states in the former Confederacy repudiated their Reconstruction-
era debts); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 126 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1890) (holding that sovereign immunity prevents 
challenges to state laws repudiating state debt in federal courts); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., 
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 992–93 (5th ed. 
2003) (describing these cases); Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Has the Legal 
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In retrospect though, it appears that sovereign immunity was interpreted 
and applied on a case-by-case basis depending on the political circumstances 
surrounding the case.127 The Court swung back and forth between finding for 
bondholders and for states (in the latter case, allowing repudiation and thus 
arguably sanctioning a constitutional violation), producing a wholly incon-
sistent body of doctrine.128 In these cases, the Court “tended to follow practi-
cal necessity; the more dire the financial straits [of a state], the more that ze-
ro-sum realities compel[led] protection” of the state via sovereign immuni-
ty.129 These precedents suggest that when a government is faced with extraor-
dinary debt demands, the Supreme Court might flexibly interpret the Consti-
tution to suit government needs.130 Moreover, even if the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to require the federal government to 
print money to avoid default, it is unclear whether the executive branch of the 
government would have to comply with that order given the Constitution’s 
separation of powers. Further, U.S. presidents have demonstrated a willing-
ness to defy the Supreme Court when they believe necessity demands it.131 If 
the executive branch did not comply, the Fourteenth Amendment would 
prove irrelevant in a practical sense; there would be no money to collect and 
the plaintiffs would essentially be left only with a judgment in their favor.132 
If, for example, a state defaults on $1 billion and the debt holders sue and 
                                                                                                                           
Threat to Sovereign Debt Restructuring Become Real? 9–10 (Centro de Investigación en Finanzas, 
Working Paper No. 04/2006, 2006) (explaining sovereign immunity). 
 127 John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1974 (1983). In the aftermath of the Civil War, several states 
moved to repudiate their state debts. Id. Because they may have been willing to ignore Supreme 
Court interpretations of the Contract Clause that held repudiation to be unconstitutional, the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity arguably allowed the court to avoid “the humiliation of seeing its 
political authority compromised.” Id. 
 128 Id. at 1996 (explaining the inconsistencies in how the doctrine of sovereign immunity was 
applied in various states). Compare Sands v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 585, 585 (1886) (allowing Vir-
ginia officers to be sued to enforce a lawyer’s right to pay for his license to practice by using a 
coupon issued by the state of Virginia), and Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 277–78 
(1885) (holding that a citizen may sue a state official in Virginia to enforce the state’s “Funding 
Act”), with Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 65, 69 (1886) (holding that individuals may not sue 
the state to enforce revenue bonds), and Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 716, 728 (1883) (hold-
ing that Louisiana officers could not be sued in equity to enforce the payment of state bonds). 
 129 Ernest A. Young, Its Hour Come Round At Last? State Sovereign Immunity and the Great 
State Debt Crisis of the Early Twenty-First Century, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 597 
(2012). 
 130 See id. (explaining that sovereign immunity may be a necessary tool to protect public 
property and therefore the use of the doctrine reflects “practical necessity”). 
 131 See infra notes 151–162 and accompanying text. 
 132 Felix Salmon, A California Default, REUTERS OPINION (Apr. 24, 2009), http://blogs.
reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/04/24/a-california-default/, archived at http://perma.cc/09fpNvFA
DrQ (arguing that challenging the default would be circular). 
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win, the state still owes them $1 billion—in other words, nothing has 
changed.133 
2. Procedural Hurdles 
Creditors that challenge a U.S. debt default would also face procedural 
hurdles—including the need to overcome sovereign immunity—to establish a 
compensable remedy and to enforce any resulting judgment against govern-
ment assets in the face of executive branch opposition.134 
The first hurdle, sovereign immunity, is theoretically the lowest hurdle 
because it can be waived if the sovereign unmistakably expresses its intent to 
do so.135 Currently, many sovereigns include explicit waivers of immunity in 
their bonds.136 The extent to which U.S. debt includes a waiver of sovereign 
immunity is unclear, though. The statute setting forth procedures for the U.S. 
government to issue debt securities makes no mention of sovereign immuni-
ty,137 and correspondence with the U.S. Department of the Treasury suggests 
that U.S. Treasury securities do not include any waivers of sovereign immuni-
ty.138 
To the extent that U.S. debt does not include an express contractual 
waiver of sovereign immunity, creditors might turn to the Tucker Act, which 
grants jurisdiction in certain courts and waives sovereign immunity for non-
tort monetary claims.139 The waiver applies to the federal government’s viola-
                                                                                                                           
 133 Id. 
 134 See Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer, supra note 126, at 11 (explaining that “waivers [of sov-
ereign immunity] are in fact routinely included in bond covenants”). This Article’s discussion of 
procedural hurdles assumes that the default continues long enough for the hurdle to become rele-
vant. For example, if the United States cures a default quickly by paying the amount in arrears, the 
paid creditor should have no further need to attempt to obtain a judgment against the United States 
or to enforce any such judgment, if obtained. 
 135 FALLON ET AL., supra note 126, at 947 (explaining that “courts have generally insisted that 
a waiver by Congress be unmistakably expressed”). 
 136 Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer, supra note 126, at 11. In fact, many creditors demand such 
waivers. Horacio T. Liendo, III, Sovereign Debt Litigation Problems in the United States: A Pro-
posed Solution, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 107, 118–19 (2007). Common waivers of immunity are for 
jurisdiction, prejudgment attachment, and attachment and execution. Id. at 119. 
 137 See 31 U.S.C. § 3121 (2006). 
 138 E-mail from Andy Young, Reference Librarian, U.S. Treasury Library, to Paulina Stanfel, 
Research Assistant to author (Aug. 6, 2013) (on file with author) (stating that based on “a response 
[that Young] received from a colleague,” and cautioning that such response is not legal advice, 
“Treasury securities, including T-bills, are considered contracts with the government. There is no 
waiver of sovereign immunity.”). 
 139 Tucker Act of 1887, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (2006) (governing claims against the 
United States); see FALLON ET AL., supra note 126, at 961–62 ( “In 1887, the Tucker Act broad-
ened the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction to include all ‘claims founded upon the Constitution of the 
United States or any law of Congress . . . .’”). 
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tions of federal statutes, executive regulations, and contracts.140 Because U.S. 
debt securities are arguably a form of debt contract, violating their payment 
terms by defaulting would likely qualify as a contract violation under the 
Tucker Act.141 Foreign creditors might also be able to take advantage of in-
ternational treaties under which the United States has waived its sovereign 
immunity defense or agreed to arbitration stemming from any debt dis-
putes.142 
The second procedural hurdle to challenging a U.S. debt default is estab-
lishing a remedy: unless creditors show they are entitled to an enforceable 
remedy, “there is no right.”143 The Tucker Act requires plaintiffs to “demon-
strate that the . . . substantive law relied upon ‘can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damage sus-
tained.’”144 The Supreme Court has held that claims based on the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment meet this standard because the clause itself 
prescribes a remedy: just compensation.145 Claims based on other constitu-
tional provisions are often rejected, however, because they do not expressly 
                                                                                                                           
 140 FALLON ET AL., supra note 126, at 961–62 (“The Tucker Act is strictly limited to claims 
for money.”). 
 141 See id. (explaining that the Tucker Act includes claims based in contract law). 
 142 See Kevin Gallagher, The New Vulture Culture: Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Trade 
and Investment Treaties 2 (The IDEAs, Working Paper No. 2/2011, 2011) (explaining that sover-
eign debt is often an “investment” covered under international investment agreements and arguing 
that this gives foreign holders of sovereign debt the right to file arbitration claims in accordance 
with the procedures laid out in such agreements). The U.S. government has effectively provided 
its consent to be sued under forty-one bilateral investment treaties and several regional treaties, 
including the North American Fair Trade Agreement and the Dominican Republic-Central Ameri-
ca Free Trade Agreement. E-mail from Julie Maupin, Lecturing Fellow, Ctr. for Int’l and Compar-
ative Law, Duke Law School, to author (Aug. 22, 2013) (on file with the author) (explaining that 
in these treaties, the United States has consented to arbitrate with foreign investors; that these 
treaties define “investment” quite broadly to include “bonds”; and that international arbitral tribu-
nals have held that sovereign debt is indeed covered by an investment treaty under this type of 
broad language); see also Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/09, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 384 (Feb. 8, 2013) (explaining that bonds 
are considered investments under the ICSID definition). 
 143 JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMEND-
MENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 5–6 (1987) (explaining that by recognizing sovereign immunity 
during the Reconstruction era, the Court denied bondholders judicial recognition of their constitu-
tional rights under the Eleventh Amendment and allowed states to repudiate their debts); see FAL-
LON ET AL., supra note 126, at 938 (explaining that the availability of certain forms of relief is 
closely connected to whether Congress has waived sovereign immunity). 
 144 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216–17 (1983) (quoting United States v. Testan, 
424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)). 
 145 U.S. CONST. amend. V; FALLON ET AL., supra note 126, at 962 (citing United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)); see Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sover-
eign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 439, 449 (2005) (explaining the Takings Clause). 
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provide for a monetary remedy.146 It is therefore uncertain that creditors as-
serting a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a U.S. debt default would clear 
this hurdle because the Fourteenth Amendment does not explicitly provide for 
a monetary remedy.147 
The last procedural hurdle is enforcing a judgment, if one is actually ob-
tained. For foreign creditors, it is generally difficult to force a reluctant gov-
ernment to pay because most sovereign assets and income streams are located 
inside the defaulting country.148 To the extent the United States has assets out-
side its jurisdictional boundaries, however, foreign creditors might be able to 
legally seize those assets to pay certain international arbitration awards.149 
Even domestic creditors could face enforcement problems. If the federal 
government defaulted because it did not have funds to pay the debt, the only 
other source of payment would likely be in the form of non-cash government 
assets. If these assets were important to government operations, the executive 
branch would likely try to defy the Court’s judgment.150 
For example, during the Supreme Court’s deliberations in Perry v. Unit-
ed States in 1935, President Franklin Roosevelt announced he would disobey 
                                                                                                                           
 146 FALLON ET AL., supra note 126, at 962 (explaining that claims based on the First Amend-
ment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteen Amendment, the Sixth Amendment’s right to coun-
sel, and the Eight Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause have all been rejected 
under the Tucker Act). Similarly, courts have rejected requests for specific performance compel-
ling the government to make payments in compliance with contracts because the Tucker Act im-
pliedly excludes contractual remedies other than monetary damages. Id. at 969. 
 147 As a litigation strategy, such creditors might try to frame their remedy as “just compensa-
tion” under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment for government breach of payment in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 148 Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer, supra note 126, at 2 (explaining that “a sovereign cannot 
credibly commit to hand over assets within its borders in the event of a default”); see Lawrence 
Lokken, A Tax Lawyer’s Observations on Scary Numbers, Politics, and Irresponsibility: A Com-
mentary on Shaviro’s Reckless Disregard, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (2004) (explaining that 
foreign ownership of U.S. debt is increasing). 
 149 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, art. 53, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
[hereinafter “ICSID Convention”]; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, art. 4, Jun. 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter “New York 
Convention”]. If those foreign creditors are nationals of states that are party to the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) Convention, which has over 140 member 
states, including the United States, Article 53 of the ICSID Convention might allow arbitral 
awards to be enforced against member-state assets. E-mail from Maupin, supra note 142. Addi-
tionally, Article V of the New York Convention, which has 146 signatory states, including the 
United States, allows the holder of a valid arbitration award to request enforcement of the award 
from the courts of any signatory state. Id. Those courts must enforce the award, including by at-
tachment of assets of a contracting state, unless one of a handful of narrow exceptions is met. Id. 
 150 See infra notes 151–162 and accompanying text (explaining that past presidents have 
demonstrated a willingness to ignore the Court). 
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the Court if it delivered an unfavorable opinion.151 In that case, the executive 
branch of the federal government refused to redeem its bonds in gold, as 
promised in the bond contracts, arguing that a June 5, 1933 joint resolution of 
Congress abrogated that promise.152 The bondholder-plaintiffs claimed that 
the joint resolution was unconstitutional because it deprived them of property 
without due process of law.153 President Roosevelt believed that having to 
redeem U.S. bonds in gold would lead to economic catastrophe.154 Anticipat-
ing a decision requiring such redemption, Roosevelt drafted a fireside chat, an 
evening radio address appealing directly to the people, announcing his inten-
tion not to comply with the Court’s ruling.155 The basis of his address was a 
necessity argument, using the Bible and the Golden Rule for support.156 The 
address was ultimately unnecessary because the Perry court decided in his 
favor, but Roosevelt’s readiness to defy the Court was clear.157 
Other presidents have shown a similar willingness to defy judicial or-
ders. President Andrew Jackson, for example, reportedly responded to a Su-
preme Court mandate with the now famous line, “John Marshall has made his 
decision, now let him enforce it.”158 President Abraham Lincoln followed suit 
in the 1861 Circuit Court for the District of Maryland case of Ex parte Mer-
ryman.159 In order to protect Washington, D.C. against secessionist forces, 
Lincoln suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.160 Chief Justice 
Roger Taney, then acting as circuit judge, declared the suspension unlaw-
ful.161 Lincoln refused to respect the decision, arguing in part that the Presi-
dent may violate a single law if it is done in order to preserve the Constitution 
                                                                                                                           
 151 Gerard N. Magliocca, The Gold Clause Cases and Constitutional Necessity, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 1243, 1258 (2012). 
 152 Perry, 294 U.S. at 347–48. 
 153 Id. at 347. 
 154 Magliocca, supra note 151, at 1247. 
 155 Id. at 1262. President Roosevelt planned to ignore such a decision until Congress passed a 
statute invoking sovereign immunity to bar further bondholder suits. Id. at 1261. 
 156 Id. at 1273–74. 
 157 The Court determined that although the Joint Resolution was unconstitutional, the bond-
holders were not entitled to relief. Magliocca, supra note 151, at 1246. 
 158 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Executive Power and the Political Constitution, 2007 UTAH L. 
REV. 1, 8–9 (explaining that President Jackson’s statement referred to “the Supreme Court’s de-
cree in Worchester v. Georgia, which ordered the State of Georgia to release a prisoner on the 
ground that his detention violated a federal treaty”). 
 159 Id. at 2–3 (citing Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487)). 
 160 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive 
Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 89–90 (1993) (explaining Ex parte Merryman). 
 161 Id. at 90. 
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as a whole—in essence, Lincoln was making a necessity argument, not unlike 
Roosevelt’s.162 
Notwithstanding these precedents, it is unclear whether the executive 
branch has the legal authority to defy orders of the judicial branch. Some ar-
gue that the executive branch must comply with such orders.163 Others con-
tend that each branch of the U.S. government can determine for itself what is 
constitutional, making judicial rulings not automatically binding on the exec-
utive.164 In the event of a true deadlock between the judicial and executive 
branches, the ultimate arbiter might end up being the legislative branch, in 
which case Congress would have to decide whether it is prepared to impeach 
the President for defying the judicial order.165 
3. Other Legal Consequences 
Depending on the contractual terms of particular U.S. debt securities, 
there might be additional legal consequences. For example, sovereign debt 
securities sometimes include cross-default clauses, under which a default by 
the sovereign on virtually any of its debt securities can trigger a default on 
other debt securities of the sovereign that include a cross-default clause.166 
Investors in those other debt securities can then accelerate the maturities of 
their debt, even if those other debt securities have been current in payment.167 
As a result, the sovereign can find huge amounts of its debt coming due un-
expectedly as a result of its default—possibly even its temporary default—on 
a relatively small amount of debt.168 Even if the sovereign subsequently cures 
                                                                                                                           
 162 Fallon, supra note 158, at 3; Paulsen, supra note 160, at 94; see supra note 156 and ac-
companying text (explaining President Roosevelt’s argument). 
 163 Fallon, supra note 158, at 11 (calling this the “Pure Judicial Supremacy Model”). 
 164 Id. at 14 (“According to the Political Constitutional Model, each of the three branches of 
the national government gets to determine for itself what the Constitution means.”). 
 165 Id. at 22–23 (arguing that Congress would likely impeach the President if he defied a judi-
cial order but that nevertheless the President could decide to “take his or her chances”). 
 166 Stephen J. Choi et al., The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, J. LEG. 
ANALYSIS, Spring 2012, at 131, 140 (describing cross-default clauses as a “common method in-
vestors [in sovereign bonds] use to protect themselves”). 
 167 Id. (emphasizing that cross-default clauses “provide that if the sovereign defaults on some 
of its debt, then that action constitutes a default on other debt even though the sovereign is other-
wise current on that debt”). 
 168 See id. In the author’s experience, the ability of creditors to use a cross-default clause to 
accelerate the maturity of their debt securities depends on the precise terms of the clause. A cross-
default clause may enable acceleration if the default on other debt continues past any applicable 
grace period or exceeds a minimal threshold amount. See id. at 147 (describing a grace period of 
thirty days). 
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that default by paying the amount originally in arrears,169 that cure would not 
necessarily rescind the acceleration of the other debt.170 
It is unclear whether any U.S. debt securities currently include cross-
default clauses.171 The statute setting forth procedures for the U.S. govern-
ment to issue debt securities makes no mention of these types of clauses,172 
thereby leaving their inclusion subject to the discretion of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.173 Even if no U.S. debt securities currently include cross-default 
clauses, such clauses could be included in future issuances of securities, per-
haps at the demand of investors.174 If any U.S. debt securities were to include 
cross-default clauses, the consequences of a U.S. debt default could be greatly 
magnified. 
B. Economic Consequences 
A U.S. debt default175 would also have both microeconomic and macro-
economic, or systemic, consequences.176 Observers have argued that a default 
would likely result in stocks, bonds, and the dollar “plummet[ing] in the im-
                                                                                                                           
 169 Cf. supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing that the United States could cure a 
default by paying the amount in arrears). 
 170 This observation is based on the author’s experience. Cf. Choi et al., supra note 166, at 
147–48 (observing that although acceleration provisions “vary a great deal,” the vote of some 
majority of creditors may be able to “reverse the acceleration”). 
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 172 See 31 U.S.C. § 3121 (2006). 
 173 Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (providing that in issuing debt obligations of the United 
States, “the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe . . . other conditions”), with 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3121(e) (providing that any “decision of the Secretary [of the Treasury] about an issue of [debt] 
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 174 Cf. supra note 166 and accompanying text (describing cross-default clauses as a “common 
method investors [in sovereign bonds] use to protect themselves”). 
 175 Recall that this Article uses the term “default” to mean a hard default: non-payment of 
debt when due, or a distressed exchange offer. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 176 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 99, at 817–18. In a previous article written by this author, I de-
scribed the difference between microeconomic and macroeconomic consequences: 
The primary goal for regulating financial risk is micro-prudential: maximizing eco-
nomic efficiency within the financial system. Systemic risk is a form of financial 
risk, so efficiency should certainly be a goal in its regulation. But systemic risk also 
represents risk to the financial system itself. Any framework for regulating systemic 
risk therefore should also include that macro-prudential goal: protecting the finan-
cial system itself. 
Id. 
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mediate aftermath.”177 Credit markets would likely freeze, harming both 
companies and consumers.178 The downgrading of credit ratings on U.S. debt 
would also make it much more difficult and expensive for the country to bor-
row.179 
Even a mere “technical” default, caused by illiquidity, could harm the 
real economy.180 The 1979 debt defaults, which were temporarily caused by a 
federal debt ceiling limit on new borrowings,181 resulted in a sixty basis point 
increase in the interest rate on Treasury bills,182 an increase that might well be 
permanent.183 Such a rate increase could also increase the cost of private bor-
rowings. Former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has observed, for ex-
                                                                                                                           
 177 Matthew Craft, U.S. Default Would Likely Cause Stocks, Bonds, Dollar to Collapse, HUFF-
INGTON POST (July 17, 2011, 4:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/17/us-default-
markets-consequences_n_901070.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SX73-LGEU. 
 178 Id.; see Beth Kobliner, How Would a U.S. Default Affect Consumers?, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jan. 29, 2011, 1:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beth-kobliner/us-default-consumers_b_
912830.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4HTZ-9SV6 (explaining the practical effects that a con-
sumer would feel if the government defaulted). 
 179 Craft, supra note 177 (explaining that “U.S. Treasury yields act like a floor for other lend-
ing rates, so raising them makes it more expensive for Americans to take out mortgages”); Ian 
Talley, Bernanke Warns on Debt-Limit ‘Chaos,’ WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Mar. 1, 2011, 2:30 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/03/01/bernanke-warns-on-debt-limit-chaos/, archived at http://perma.
cc/B5UA-JYRN (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke as saying: “For a long time 
[after a default], the U.S. would have to pay higher interest rates in the market and that would make 
our deficit problems even more intractable.”). Although the accompanying depreciation of the dollar 
would improve global price competitiveness of U.S. goods and services, thereby increasing net ex-
ports and decreasing U.S. net external debt, the negative impacts of currency depreciation, such as 
decreasing international purchasing power in conjunction with higher borrowing costs, would over-
shadow any excess revenue from export increases. See CRAIG K. ELWELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34582, THE DEPRECIATING DOLLAR: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY RESPONSE 9–12 (2012); 
Jonathan Masters, U.S. Debt Ceiling: Costs and Consequences, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://
www.cfr.org/international-finance/us-debt-ceiling-costs-consequences/p24751#p7, archived at http://
perma.cc/WJ6N-MB83 (last updated Oct. 4, 2013) (explaining how a U.S. default could cause the 
dollar’s value to decline). 
 180 See Belton et al., supra note 18, at 1 (defining a technical default as a delay in payment 
that “is quite short-term (less than a few days)”); infra note 189 and accompanying text (explain-
ing that investors depend not only on ultimate payment in full but also on timely payment when 
due, and indeed credit-rating agencies take both factors into account and even a temporary delay 
in payment is regarded as an actual default). 
 181 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (explaining the 1979 defaults). The default-
ed amounts in 1979 were also relatively small. Zivney & Marcus, supra note 48, at 476 (estimat-
ing that there were about $122 million defaulted T-bills in May 1979). 
 182 When Did the U.S. Last Default on Treasury Bonds?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 11, 2011, 
3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/11/137773341/looking-at-when-the-u-s-last-defaulted-on-
treasury-bond, archived at http://perma.cc/467J-F4ST (estimating these defaults resulted in bil-
lions of dollars in increased borrowing costs in 1997 (citing Zivney & Marcus, supra note 48)). 
 183 Zivney & Marcus, supra note 48, at 487 (concluding that “the series of defaults [in 1979] 
resulted in a permanent increase in interest rates of about 60 basis points”). 
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ample, that a U.S. debt default would “raise all borrowing costs” because “US 
Treasuries set the benchmark borrowing rate” for private loans.184 
Investment bank J.P. Morgan recently issued a report updating the po-
tential economic impact of a technical default. The report assumes that the 
United States temporarily misses an interest or principal payment on its 
debt.185 Even if this temporary default does not reflect an actual deterioration 
of U.S. solvency, it still would “almost certainly have large systemic effects 
with long-term adverse consequences for Treasury finances and the US econ-
omy.”186 At a minimum, the United States would likely see a one percent re-
duction in gross domestic product due to higher interest rates and a likely eq-
uity selloff.187 Even worse, the report concluded that the default also “could 
leave lasting damage in its wake due to a permanent decline in foreign de-
mand [for U.S. Treasury securities], which will likely lead to [continuing] 
higher borrowing costs and larger deficits.”188 
A technical default could also impair the credit rating on U.S. debt secu-
rities. Credit-rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s assign sov-
ereign-debt ratings based not only on the government’s ability to pay its debt 
                                                                                                                           
 184 William W. Bratton, A World Without Treasuries?, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIF-
FERENT?, supra note 1, at 13, 13 (citing Letter from Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, to 
Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
connect/blog/Pages/letter.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/F8J6-ZY8U). The U.S. Department of 
the Treasury reiterated this observation in its report cautioning about the potential impact of a U.S. 
debt default due to Congress’s failure to raise the federal debt ceiling. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., 
THE POTENTIAL MACROECONOMIC EFFECT OF DEBT CEILING BRINKSMANSHIP 4–5 (2013) (ex-
plaining that “[w]ith Treasury yields rising this year, a widening in spreads would lead to an in-
crease in yields on corporate debt,” and would similarly “increase mortgage rates, raising the cost 
of buying a home”). 
 185 Belton et al., supra note 18, at 1. 
 186 Id.; see also supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (observing that even an otherwise 
temporary U.S. debt default could undermine the nation’s perceived creditworthiness, making it 
more expensive or difficult to borrow in order to repay future maturing debt and therefore increas-
ing rollover risk and potentially triggering a larger debt crisis). The recent Department of Treasury 
report was even more blunt than this, as it stated that “[i]n the event that a debt limit impasse were 
to lead to a default, it could have a catastrophic effect on not just financial markets but also on job 
creation, consumer spending and economic growth . . . .” U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., supra note 184, 
at 6. 
 187 Belton et al., supra note 18, at 6 (suggesting that, aside from gross domestic product “the 
ultimate damage [to the economy] could be far greater”). 
 188 Id. at 4; cf. The Mother of All Tail Risks, ECONOMIST, June 25, 2011, at 83, 83–84 (esti-
mating that a temporary U.S. debt default today could cost the U.S. government approximately 
$86 billion yearly; observing that foreign investors have shown a newfound willingness to diversi-
fy their holdings; and discussing indirect effects of a U.S. debt default, such as impairing the use 
of Treasury securities as collateral in the repo and derivatives markets). The prediction of a per-
manent decline in foreign demand for U.S. Treasury securities reflects J.P. Morgan’s internal 
research showing that foreign investors would react much more negatively than U.S. domestic 
investors to a technical default. Belton et al, supra note 18, at 5. 
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in full, but also on its ability and willingness to pay its debt on time.189 The 
ratings decision therefore normally includes an examination of the sover-
eign’s past payment performance.190 Thus, during the 2011 federal debt ceil-
ing crisis, Moody’s commented that “[a]n actual default, regardless of dura-
tion, would fundamentally alter Moody’s assessment of the timeliness of fu-
ture payments, and a Aaa rating would likely no longer be appropriate [for 
U.S. debt].”191 If both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s reduced their ratings 
on U.S. debt securities, the nation’s borrowing costs would almost certainly 
increase significantly.192 
The discussion so far has examined the economic consequences of an 
actual, albeit temporary, U.S. debt default. The mere threat of such a debt de-
fault, however, might also raise borrowing costs. A 2012 U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report found, for example, that the 2011 federal 
debt ceiling crisis caused Treasury borrowing costs to increase by $1.3 billion 
for the fiscal year of 2011 alone.193 According to the report, delays in raising 
the debt ceiling caused investors to view Treasury securities as riskier, and 
thus they demanded a higher interest rate.194 
IV. HOW COULD THE CONSEQUENCES OF A DEFAULT BE MITIGATED? 
Given the serious consequences of a U.S. debt default, it is important to 
examine how to mitigate those consequences. The analysis below first con-
siders a debt restructuring. Although a bilateral, or consensual, restructuring 
could theoretically avoid a default or mitigate its consequences, it likely 
                                                                                                                           
 189 STANDARD & POOR’S, HOW WE RATE SOVEREIGNS 3 (2012), available at http://www.
standardandpoors.com/spf/ratings/How_We_Rate_Sovereigns_3_13_12.pdf, archived at http://perma.
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proach, MOODY’S, http://www.moodys.com/Pages/amr002003.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/TM3Z-LW2P (last visited Nov. 24, 2013) (same). 
 190 See STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 189, at 3. 
 191 Moody’s Investors Service, Announcement: Moody’s Places US Aaa Government Bond 
Rating and Related Ratings on Review for Possible Downgrade, MOODY’S, July 13, 2011, https://
www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Places-US-Aaa-Government-Bond-Rating-and-Related-Ratings-
PR_221800, archived at http://perma.cc/PXU9-6C23. 
 192 See Carmen M. Reinhart, Default, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Credit Ratings, 
WORLD BANK ECON. REV., Aug. 2002, at 151, 151 (“Credit ratings have been shown to have a 
significant impact on the yield spreads of sovereign bonds.”). 
 193 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-701, DEBT LIMIT: ANALYSIS OF 2011–2012 
ACTIONS TAKEN AND EFFECT OF DELAYED INCREASE ON BORROWING COSTS 21–22 (2012). 
 194 Id.; cf. Belton et al., supra note 18, at 2 (observing that investors will “undertake risk-
management actions in preparation for a potential Treasury default”). Additionally, if investors 
view Treasury securities as risky, regulators might want firms that use Treasuries to comply with 
capital requirements to value such securities at a discount. Cf. id. (discussing how rising yields 
could impact net asset values). 
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would take too long to be effective.195 A unilateral debt restructuring could be 
implemented quickly, but it too would likely fail to mitigate consequences 
because it is tantamount to a default.196 The analysis also considers a debt 
bailout, arguing that although the IMF might have the economic wherewithal 
to bail out the United States, the conditionality imposed by the IMF as a quid 
pro quo would likely be politically unacceptable to the United States.197 
A. Debt Restructuring 
A U.S. debt default could be avoided by restructuring the debt prior to 
actual default, enabling the government to repay the debt as it comes due.198 
The consequences of such a default might also be mitigated if the debt were 
restructured after default.199 
It is essential that any method of restructuring U.S. debt be speedy. This is 
because if done to avoid default, the restructuring would have to be in place 
before the debt matures.200 And if done to mitigate the consequences of a de-
fault, time would be of the essence in order to minimize financial chaos.201 
Debt restructuring therefore could not be a complete solution to rollover risk, 
especially if the illiquidity is recognized at the last moment, because it is un-
likely that it could be completed within the requisite timeframe.202 
In a non-U.S. context, bilateral restructuring of sovereign debt would be 
an option.203 But bilateral approaches—meaning debt restructuring that 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See infra notes 203–204 and accompanying text (explaining the consequences of a bilat-
eral restructuring of U.S. debt). 
 196 See infra notes 205–212 and accompanying text (explaining the consequences of a unilat-
eral restructuring of U.S. debt). 
 197 See infra notes 213–232 and accompanying text (considering the implications of a 
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 198 See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment on 
Default and Restructuring, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 169, 234 
(explaining that restructuring means reducing the debt through legal channels and through “selec-
tive intentional default” on some of the debt). Say, for example, that $100 billion of debt is com-
ing due on a certain date (“Date 1”), when the government will only have $75 billion in funds, but 
the government expects to have an additional $25 billion in funds by a later date (“Date 2”). A 
debt default could be avoided by restructuring the debt prior to Date 1 so that (for simplicity, ig-
noring the time value of money) only $75 billion comes due on Date 1 and the remaining $25 
billion comes due on or after Date 2. 
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 201 Bernstein, supra note 122, at 237. 
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 203 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 
EMORY L. J. 1189 (2004) [hereinafter Idiot’s Guide] (discussing the different approaches to sover-
eign debt restructuring); Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorgan-
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achieves the consent of both the debtor-nation and its creditors—would not 
necessarily be speedy, nor are they intended to address the uniquely chaotic 
problem of a U.S. sovereign debt default.204 
The United States could attempt to unilaterally restructure its debt. Ar-
gentina unilaterally restructured its debt in 2001, and Russia did it in 1998.205 
But to do so would effectively amount to the United States refusing to pay 
national debt while dictating to creditors new payment terms.206 That is close 
enough to a debt repudiation to be certain to generate numerous Fourteenth 
Amendment lawsuits.207 Indeed, any sovereign unilateral debt restructuring 
tends to generate multiple lawsuits, even absent constitutional issues.208 A 
U.S. unilateral debt restructuring would likely also spark the filing of arbitra-
tion claims against the United States, under international treaties.209 
Furthermore, unilateral debt restructuring—even if the government 
merely delays when payments are to be made, as opposed to writing off por-
tions of its debt—is tantamount to a default because creditors are not paid on 
a timely basis according to their original contractual terms.210 That could cre-
ate the same risk of systemic contagion as a default that is not cloaked in 
debt-restructuring language.211 Unilateral debt restructurings could also end 
up being costly to the government imposing them by increasing the price of 
future borrowing. For example, Argentine sovereign bond spreads rose 6000 
                                                                                                                           
ization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (2000) (discussing at length how national debt in a non-
U.S. context could and should be bilaterally restructured); Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Re-
structuring Options: An Analytical Comparison, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 95 (2012) [hereinafter Sover-
eign Debt Restructuring Options] (discussing debt restructuring alternatives to bailouts). 
 204 See Mooney, supra note 198, at 234 (evaluating the “feasibility of any type of restructur-
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tions”). 
 205 Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options, supra note 203, at 101 n.39, 111. 
 206 See Anna Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina, INT’L FIN. L. REV., 
Apr. 2005, at 19, 20 (explaining how Argentina restructured its debt by changing the terms of 
existing obligations). 
 207 See supra notes 114–124 (explaining how the Fourteenth Amendment imposes limits on 
the U.S. government’s ability to repudiate its debt). 
 208 Cf. Gelpern, supra note 206, at 21 (noting that Argentina faced thousands of lawsuits, 
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restructuring). 
 209 E-mail from Maupin, supra note 142 (providing examples of treaties that might require the 
United States to arbitrate debt disputes); see supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text (observ-
ing that foreign creditors might be able to legally seize U.S. assets to pay certain international 
arbitration awards). 
 210 Cf. Gelpern, supra note 206, at 20 (explaining that in its unilateral restructuring, Argentina 
“pushed off maturities on over $30 billion” and “swap[ped] about $42 billion in foreign bonds for 
loans paying much lower interest rates”). 
 211 Cf. supra note 16 (characterizing a distressed, or non-consensual, exchange offer as a type 
of hard default). 
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basis points after Argentina’s 2001 announcement that it would unilaterally 
restructure its debt.212 
B. Bailout 
By definition, a bailout could mitigate the consequences of a U.S. debt 
default. But there likely is only one institution that might have the economic 
wherewithal to bail out the United States: the IMF.213 Conceived at a United 
Nations conference at the close of World War II, the IMF was created to fos-
ter global economic cooperation and to avoid a repetition of the Great De-
pression.214 With 188 member nations, the IMF can help to bail out its mem-
bers by lending them money.215 Although these loans historically have gone 
to developing, rather than developed, countries,216 nations like Greece, Portu-
gal, and Ireland have recently turned to the IMF for help.217 
As a condition of lending, the IMF customarily requires certain reform 
measures.218 Such “conditionality” can include, for example, austerity 
measures such as controlling budget revenues and restructuring the nation’s 
banks.219 By accepting IMF money with its conditionality, a country thus for-
                                                                                                                           
 212 Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options, supra note 203, at 111. There was, however, little 
systemic contagion from Argentina’s unilateral debt restructuring, probably because Argentina’s 
economy was neither significant nor interconnected enough to the larger world economy. Cf. FIN. 
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feits a measure of control over its economy.220 Politically, it is far from clear 
that the United States would accept that, even if faced with default.221 
If, however, the IMF were to offer a bailout that the United States ac-
cepts, it could help to alleviate U.S. debt problems.222 If the bailout occurs 
quickly enough, it could help prevent the debt default; and even if a default 
occurs, a bailout could provide the United States with stability223 by allowing 
it to pay its defaulted creditors.224 In addition, the announcement of a bailout 
tends to positively affect domestic stock prices, possibly reducing the threat 
posed by systemic risk.225 If the terms of an IMF bailout were more leni-
ent,226 it might also provide the United States with an opportunity to improve 
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 220 Johnson & Young, supra note 125, at 139 (explaining that examples of IMF conditionality 
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 222 Cf. Johnson & Young, supra note 125, at 120 (proposing a bailout as a possible solution in 
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 223 See supra notes 17–18, 180 and accompanying text (differentiating technical defaults due 
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United States went into default because of insolvency. See supra notes 17–18, 180 and accompa-
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 225 See Sie Ting Lau & Thomas H. McInish, IMF Bailouts, Contagion Effects, and Bank Se-
curity Returns, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 3, 10 (2003) (demonstrating stock markets’ respons-
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its long-term ability to service debts; and a decrease in the debt burden would 
free financial resources for things like structural reforms.227 
Despite its potential benefits, any IMF bailout of U.S. debt would not be 
problem-free.228 For example, it likely would further increase the risk of mor-
al hazard; if the IMF helps to defray U.S. debt, virtually all IMF member na-
tions might expect IMF protection against default, reducing their incentives to 
make prudent economic decisions.229 In the same vein, creditors who antici-
pate such protection will have more incentive to take unwarranted financial 
risks when lending to IMF member nations.230 Austerity measures can also 
backfire.231 Recently, the IMF admitted it made mistakes when imposing 
conditionality on Greece, both underestimating the costs and not foreseeing 
the harm to the Greek economy of its austerity measures.232 
CONCLUSION 
It is unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, that the United States will 
default on its national debt due to insolvency, but its “rollover risk” —the risk 
that the government will become temporarily illiquid and unable to borrow 
sufficient funds to repay its debt—is real. The U.S. government’s heavy reli-
ance on short-term, frequently maturing debt aggravates the problem, as does 
the ongoing political dispute over the federal debt ceiling, which limits the 
amount of new debt that can be issued to repay maturing debt. Yet the harm 
caused by a U.S. debt default, even if the default is temporary, could be dev-
astating. It would raise government borrowing costs, not only for the United 
States but for nations worldwide. It would almost certainly have severe sys-
temic consequences, causing financial markets to plummet and credit markets 
to freeze, and in turn making it difficult for companies to borrow. 
Such a default would also likely attract numerous lawsuits, raising le-
gal issues of first impression. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
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stitution, for example, makes it illegal for the federal government to renege 
on its debt. If the government lacks money to pay the debt on a timely basis, 
would the default be unconstitutional? Creditors challenging a U.S. debt 
default would also face several complex procedural legal hurdles, including 
the need to overcome sovereign immunity, to establish a compensable rem-
edy, and to enforce any resulting judgment against government assets in the 
face of executive branch opposition. 
Given the consequences of default, the government should focus more 
on the goal of managing its rollover risk. Ironically, the primary goal of U.S. 
debt issuance traditionally has been minimizing the cost of debt issuance; but 
that goal motivates the increasing use of short-term debt, which in turn in-
creases rollover risk. The government must try to balance these conflicting 
goals. 
The government should also examine how it could address defaults that 
otherwise would result from rollover risk. As this Article has shown, it has 
considerable, though not unlimited, flexibility to do that, including by “mone-
tizing” its debt and printing money to pay maturing debt. But these responses 
could be costly, at the very least sparking inflation. Moreover, the govern-
ment’s flexibility to print money to avoid default could change in the future if 
the dollar loses its role as the international reserve currency. 
Rollover risk could also be managed by restructuring debt prior to actual 
default. But bilateral debt restructuring, with the consent of both the govern-
ment and its creditors, might not always be feasible in time to avoid default; 
whereas a unilateral debt restructuring would be tantamount to a default be-
cause creditors would not be paid on a timely basis according to their original 
contract terms. A bailout is also unlikely. Only the IMF might have the eco-
nomic wherewithal to bail out the United States; but even if otherwise feasi-
ble, an IMF bailout might not be politically acceptable if (as almost certainly 
would be the case) it is conditioned on IMF-imposed austerity measures. 
Bottom line: there is no magic bullet to put an end to rollover risk. Real-
istic self-imposed measures of governmental austerity, as well as controls on 
the issuance of new short-term debt, will likely be needed. As a prominent 
(and savvy) bankruptcy expert has observed: 
The lesson for the United States is at once blindingly obvious and 
one that none of us wants to hear. Either revenue (taxes) must con-
tinue to grow or the cost of government services and benefits, and 
other national financial commitments, must be reduced . . . . Find-
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ing clever ways to address the nation’s existing public debt simply 
will not solve the problem.233 
The critical question is whether the United States has the political will 
and integrity to better manage its debt and rollover risk, before it defaults.234 
The world is waiting for the answer.235 
                                                                                                                           
 233 Bernstein, supra note 122, at 243. 
 234 There is some evidence that the U.S. Treasury is currently intent on issuing debt with 
longer maturities, although its rationale appears to be to lock in historically low interest rates ra-
ther than to control rollover risk. See Jeffrey Sparshott, U.S. Treasury Considers Ways to Extend 
Debt Maturity, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Feb. 6, 2013, 1:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/
2013/02/06/u-s-treasury-considers-ways-to-extend-debt-maturity/, archived at http://perma.cc/W2
KV-SBJF. Given that rationale, the U.S. Treasury would presumably go back to issuing more 
short-term debt once interest rates return to normal levels. See id. (explaining that “[l]onger matur-
ities fit with Treasury’s efforts to lock in interest rates at historically low levels”). 
 235 See, e.g., Belton et al., supra note 18, at 1 (observing that “the foreign investor community . . . 
holds nearly half of all [U.S.] Treasury securities”); David Gordon Smith, The World from Berlin: The 
US Is Holding the Whole World Hostage, SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 15, 2011, 1:54 PM), http://www.
spiegel.de/international/world/the-world-from-berlin-the-us-is-holding-the-whole-world-hostage-a-
774666-druck.html, archived at http://perma.cc/T79J-VYYF (“Nobody can imagine what the reper-
cussions might be if the unthinkable happens and the US [sic] is suddenly no longer a safe haven for 
investors. Anything is possible, from a small, barely perceptible amount of turbulence in the financial 
markets to a global panic.”). 
  
 
